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Abstract: In 1828, in the course of delivering his famous speech on law reform to the House 
of Lords, Henry Brougham identified “the difficulty… arising of necessity from our distance” 
as the great challenge faced by the Privy Council. This article explores the strategies 
subsequently used by the Privy Council in its attempts to overcome that difficulty. Some of 
these strategies involved the court appearing to move closer to the jurisdiction from which the 
appeal had come. These included being seen to apply foreign standards in its decisions, 
positioning its analyses against the grain of traditional English doctrines and making use of 
the expertise of former colonial judges. Other strategies implicitly asserted that distance was 
irrelevant by appealing to universal principles, to policy and to general common sense. 
Occasionally the Privy Council felt that the difficulty of distance loomed so large that it was 
inappropriate to decide the case. By using these different strategies skilfully and 
opportunistically, the Privy Council managed to maintain both its legal credibility and its 
moral authority, in spite of the formidable difficulties of distance with which it continued to 
be faced. 
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The difficulty… arising of necessity from our distance, an unavoidable incident to our 
colonial empire, may almost be deemed an incapacity, for it involves both ignorance of the 
law, and unfitness to judge of the facts. 
Henry Brougham 
 
1. The Difficulty 
In 1828, in the course of delivering his famous speech on law reform to the House of 
Commons, Henry Brougham turned his attention to the Privy Council’s jurisdiction over 
what he called “Plantation appeals”. The members of the Privy Council, he explained1 –  
are thus made the supreme judges, in the last resort, over every one of our foreign 
settlements, whether situated in those immense territories which you possess in 
the East; where you and a trading company together rule over not less than 
seventy millions of subjects; or are established among those rich and populous 
lands which stud the Indian Ocean, and form the great Eastern Archipelago; or 
have their stations in those lands, part lying within the Tropics; part stretching 
towards the Pole, peopled by various castes differing widely in habits, still more 
widely in privileges; great in numbers, abounding in wealth, extremely unsettled 
in their notions of right, and excessively litigious, as all the children of the New 
World are supposed to be, both from their physical and political constitution. All 
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this immense jurisdiction over the rights of property and person, over rights 
political and legal; and all the questions growing out of such a vast and varied 
province, is exercised by the Privy Council unaided and alone. It is obvious that, 
from mere distance of those colonies, and the immense variety of matters arising 
in them, foreign to our habits, and beyond the scope of our knowledge, any 
judicial tribunal in this country must, of necessity, be an extremely inadequate 
court of review.  
This was challenging enough; but Brougham went on to explain that there were further 
problems: 
what adds incredibly to the difficulty is, that hardly any two of the colonies can 
be named which have the same law; and in the greater number the law is wholly 
unlike our own. In some Settlements, it is the Dutch law; in others the Spanish, in 
others the French, in others the Danish. In our Eastern possessions these 
variations are, if possible, yet greater: while one territory is swayed by the 
Mohammedan law, another is ruled by the native or Hindu law, and this again, in 
some of our possessions, is qualified or superseded by the law of Budda, the 
English jurisprudence being confined to the handful of British settlers, and the 
inhabitants of the three presidencies. All these laws must come, in their turns, in 
review, before the necessarily ignorant privy councillor, after the learned doctors 
in each have differed.  
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“The difficulty thus arising of necessity from our distance”, he concluded, “an unavoidable 
accident to our colonial empire, may almost be deemed an incapacity, for it involves both 
ignorance of the law, and unfitness to judge of the facts.”2 
Brougham’s identification of the difficulty of distance as the Privy Council’s major – and, 
one could almost say, its defining – weakness was a characteristically perceptive insight. As 
the passage read as a whole makes clear, he was not making a mundane point about the 
length and expense of journeys that litigants and their representatives might have to 
undertake in order to attend a hearing of the Privy Council; nor was he seeking to emphasise 
the delays in litigation that such journeys would inevitably cause. “Distance” was being used 
as much figuratively as literally: it was not so much the physical distance in itself that 
mattered, as the remoteness, unfamiliarity and sheer foreignness that the physical distance 
entailed. There were unique governmental arrangements to contend with, dramatic contrasts 
in the distribution of wealth, and enormous variations in climate, all of which were significant 
in themselves and shaped the habits and expectations of the inhabitants. A court merely 
seeking to apply English law principles to such very diverse societies would already have 
faced some nice problems calling for sophisticated and sensitive solutions. As it was, the task 
was even more delicate: Privy Council members were required to adjudicate on questions of 
whatever law happened to be in force in the jurisdiction from which the appeal had been 
brought. As the British Empire grew, so did the number of legal systems from which 
questions might come to the Privy Council. Brougham’s catalogue of systems illustrated the 
eclectic demands of the Privy Council’s remit in the early nineteenth century; and life was no 
simpler for early twentieth century members of the Judicial Committee. As Frederick Pollock 
recorded in 1906, the Privy Council could be required to pronounce on systems as diverse as 
Quebec’s “essentially French law and procedure”, the Isle of Man’s “peculiar body of laws of 
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ancient, apparently Scandinavian origin” and “the possible variations of Hindu law by special 
custom” applicable in India.3 Mauritius and the Straits Settlements presented different 
problems, as they blended English law with other elements.
4 
Brougham regarded the difficulty of distance as so severe that it might “almost be deemed 
incapacity”. At first glance the claim looks exaggerated – the Privy Council’s “capacity”, we 
might be tempted to reply, was determined by British constitutional arrangements in which 
any difficulty of distance was irrelevant. Brougham, however, was surely using the idea of 
incapacity in a more evaluative and illuminating way, to denote the Privy Council’s ability to 
carry out its role as the Empire’s court of final appeal. Taken in this sense, the implications of 
the difficulty of distance were indeed formidable, because they prevented the Privy Council 
from being able to rely on two traditionally compelling bases for recognising a court’s 
(moral) authority. The first was technical expertise: as Brougham recognised, it was simply 
not possible to claim superior knowledge on the part of Privy Council members when appeals 
could be brought from such an eclectic array of jurisdictions. The second basis was social 
solidarity, an idea which was particularly powerful in a common law system, where – at least 
in theory – the law was thought to be grounded in social acceptance. Again, it was not 
obviously plausible for the Privy Council to be claiming to be in touch with the relevant 
society’s needs and aspirations – the court was, by definition, remote from the society to 
which its pronouncements would apply. In short, the difficulty of distance had the potential to 
undermine both the court’s moral authority and the credibility of its judgments.  
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That potential, however, would not be realised, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council – created on Brougham’s initiative in 1833 – continues to function as the final court 
of appeal for several jurisdictions even today. Its longevity is surprising given the inevitable 
vulnerabilities to which the difficulty of distance gives rise. The purpose of this article is to 
look closely at a selection of the court’s jurisprudence where issues of distance loomed large, 
to analyse revealing extra-curial writings about the court and its judges, and to consider the 
significance of Parliamentary discussions of the Privy Council’s role. The article argues that 
the Privy Council skilfully managed the difficulty by deploying a range of techniques that, 
not entirely self-consistently, sometimes disguised, sometimes acknowledged, and, most 
commonly, marginalised distance. 
 
2. Location in Practice and Theory 
Perhaps the most striking way in which the Privy Council sought to disguise the difficulty of 
distance was by pretending that the court was somewhere else. There were, indeed, 
occasional suggestions that it should, quite literally, be somewhere else – with, for instance, 
Indian appeals being heard in India
5
 – but these suggestions came to nothing, and it remained 
in its Downing Street home. However, that did not preclude a little armchair travel. As the 
Registrar to the Privy Council, Sir Charles Neish, explained in 1929,
6 
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In the Privy Council the theory has always prevailed that when the Board is 
hearing an Appeal from any dependency of the Crown, it is in effect sitting as a 
Court of that dependency, and local counsel can appear subject to exactly the 
same conditions as those under which they could appear in the Court appealed 
from. 
Such equivocation – to be in London in reality and elsewhere in “theory” – was also, 
apparently, achieved by the best judges. Sir James Colvile was praised for his “instinct to 
survey a question with the eyes at once of an Englishman and a Hindoo”.7 Lord Haldane went 
further, writing admiringly of Lord Watson’s ability to inhabit whichever legal system was 
involved in a Privy Council appeal. For Haldane, Watson was “the Privy Council Judge par 
excellence …he never failed to endeavour to interpret the law according to the spirit of the 
jurisprudence of the Colony from which the appeal came. If it was a Cape appeal, he was a 
Roman Dutch lawyer; if it was an Indian case of adoption, he entered into the religious 
reasons for the rule to be applied”.8 The process is made to sound like impersonation, or, at 
the very least, assuming a theatrical role. Later commentators have been less generous to 
Watson, feeling that he was too quick to abandon his Scottish heritage when questions were 
raised about the distinctive character of Scots law.
9
 For our purposes, however, what is 
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important is not so much Watson’s actual achievements as Haldane’s perception of what the 
ideal Privy Council judge should do.  
Other judges may have lacked Watson’s chameleon-like ability to adapt to his legal 
surroundings, but they often went out of their way to signal that they were not rigidly 
applying English standards to the cases they heard. One dramatic illustration is provided by 
McLeod v St Aubyn
10
, in which Watson was a member of the Board, but did not deliver its 
advice. The facts revealed a grotesque abuse of power on the part of the respondent, who, as 
the acting Chief Justice of St Vincent, had sentenced the appellant to fourteen days 
imprisonment for contempt of court for lending a newspaper that the appellant had not yet 
read to a public library (whose own copy had been delayed in the post). The newspaper 
contained material attacking the respondent’s professional integrity. In the course of allowing 
the appeal, the Board emphasised many of the points that we might have expected, such as 
the objectionable use of contempt proceedings to protect the judge’s personal reputation, and 
the “extraordinary” scope of the offence if it really could be committed inadvertently.11 
However, the Board made it very clear that the case was not to be judged by English 
metropolitan standards: “it must be considered”, they stated, “that in small colonies, 
consisting principally of coloured populations, the enforcement in proper cases of committal 
for contempt of Court for attacks on the Court may be absolutely necessary to preserve in 
such a community the dignity of and respect for the Court”.12 The Board was, it seems, 
anxious to be seen to appreciate the different standards called for by Caribbean conditions, 
and showed its appreciation in a striking way. Evidently it was seeking to overcome the 
difficulty of distance by using empathy, but it was not attempting to empathise with the local 
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population; it was, instead, imagining itself in the position of the colonial judges from whose 
decisions it was hearing appeals. 
A different kind of refusal to apply British standards could be seen in the very different 
context of general damages for personal injury. The accurate quantification of such damages 
has been a perennial problem in English law since the middle of the last century, when jury 
assessment was phased out, and it has remained impossible to identify a method for 
calculating exact sums. Instead, the emphasis has come to be on consistency between awards, 
and on maintaining a coherent scale reflecting relative seriousness of harm.
13
 Overseas courts 
applying English law faced identical difficulties, but with an added twist when it came to 
identifying appropriate comparators to inform their assessment: should awards in other 
jurisdictions be taken into account, and, if so, which jurisdictions? English courts, it seems, 
have never needed to address this question. 
What remains the fundamental guideline was articulated by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in 
Jag Singh v Toong Fong Omnibus Co Ltd
14
, a case in which the Court of Appeal of Malaya 
had referred to Singaporean awards of general damages. “To the extent to which regard 
should be had to the range of awards in other cases which are comparable”, it was said, “such 
cases should as a rule be those which have been determined in the same jurisdiction or a 
neighbouring locality where similar social, economic and industrial conditions exist”.15 Later, 
the instinctive feeling that general damages for personal injury were expressive of socio-
economic conditions led the Privy Council to decline to exercise a power, conferred on it by 
the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, to substitute its own award where the local court’s 
                                                          
13
 A Ogus, “Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?” (1972) 35 MLR 1; Heil v 
Rankin [2001] QB 272.  
14
 [1964] 1 WLR 1382. 
15
 [1964] 1 WLR 1382, 1385. 
10 
 
was erroneous: only a Judge of the Trinidadian High Court, they sensed, would have the 
requisite local knowledge.
16
 
Perhaps the most suggestive of the cases on general damages for personal injury was Chan 
Wai Tong v Li Ping Sum
17, where a defendant objected to a Hong Kong Court’s reference to 
English awards. The Privy Council held that the reference had had no effect on the Hong 
Kong court’s assessment, but took the opportunity to reiterate the position set out in the Jag 
Singh case: “a court should in general have regard only to awards in the same jurisdiction or 
in a neighbouring locality where the relevant conditions are similar”.18 England, on this 
principle, was not a comparable jurisdiction: “unless and until the courts in Hong Kong are 
satisfied that social and economic conditions, including especially the rate of earnings, in 
Hong Kong are similar to those in England”, English awards were to be disregarded.19 The 
Privy Council’s reasoning helpfully articulated the relationship between between general 
damages for personal injury and other, ostensibly distinct, wider phenomena; but perhaps the 
most interesting factor in the case was the argument to which the Privy Council was 
responding. For the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong had hinted at a very different method of 
comparison when it observed that awards in England were approximately three times higher 
than those in Hong Kong, and “it is difficult to understand why there should be such startling 
disparity between the levels of awards in the two jurisdictions”.20 The implication was that, 
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irrespective of socio-economic context, Hong Kong Courts were undervaluing the pain, 
suffering and loss of amenity of claimants, and needed to readjust their awards. The Privy 
Council’s rejection of this position tells us something rather disheartening about deferring to 
the difficulty of distance. Undoubtedly the legal rules retain a certain authenticity, and 
consistency with their socio-economic context, but what we might call the benefits of 
distance – the opportunity to put things in a wider perspective, and to draw illuminating 
comparisons – are lost. There is also a rather defeatist attitude to the relationship between law 
and social change inherent in the Privy Council’s reasoning, for it assumes that while socio-
economic changes may necessitate legal change, the relationship is only one-way. The 
potential for legal changes (such as an increase in personal injury damages awards) to 
contribute to social changes (such as more responsible attitudes to workplace and road safety) 
is disallowed. Finally, we might pause to register the oddity, the almost Alice in Wonderland 
quality, of a London-based panel of English and Scottish judges insisting on Hong Kong 
localism, in the face of attempts by Hong Kong judges to Anglicise their personal injury 
awards. Where the Privy Council was – whether in fact or in theory – gave little indication of 
its agenda. 
 
3. Respect for Colonial Governance 
One area in which the Privy Council could almost be relied upon to define itself against its 
location was in matters of colonial governance. The Privy Council’s Downing Street base 
might, perhaps, have been expected to predispose it towards arguments restricting colonial 
autonomy, or invoking English constitutional truisms; but the court consistently rejected such 
arguments. Two striking illustrations are provided by Attorney-General for New South Wales 
12 
 
v Rennie
21
 and Gould v Stuart
22
, both appeals from New South Wales, which were decided 
within three months of each other. Rennie’s case involved what, at first glance, looked to be a 
rather abstruse question of statutory construction: did “Legislative Assembly” in the 
Parliamentary Representatives’ Allowance Act (53 Vict no 12) refer only to the Legislative 
Assembly existing at the date of the Act? If so, the consequences were dramatic (and explain 
why the case reached the Privy Council): another piece of New South Wales legislation had 
limited the term of Legislative Assemblies to five years; the Legislative Assembly existing at 
the time the Parliamentary Representatives’ Allowance Act was passed had been dissolved; 
so it followed – if the appellant’s interpretation was correct – that no allowances could be 
claimed by members of the current Legislative Assembly. The Privy Council’s decision that 
the allowances remained claimable showed that it appreciated the wider ramifications of the 
decision. “‘Legislative Assembly’, said Sir Richard Couch,  
means the Assembly created by the Constitution Act, which, though liable to be 
dissolved or to expire by effluxion of time, is an essential part of the constitution 
of the colony and must be regarded as a permanent body. If it was considered to 
be just or proper to give an allowance for expenses to the members of the existing 
Assembly, it may be reasonably presumed to be equally so to give the same 
allowance to the members of a future Assembly.
23 
The Legislative Assembly, and, by implication, other constitutional organs in New South 
Wales, were not to be seen as tentative experiments, subject to cancellation if results proved 
unsatisfactory. On the contrary, they were legitimate, established institutions for which 
appropriate ancillary arrangements were needed. There is not the slightest trace in the Privy 
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Council’s decision of any sympathy with the idea that self-government was conditional, or 
revocable.  
Gould v Stuart
24
 raised questions of self-determination in the rather different context of the 
Crown’s right to dismiss its officers at will. The respondent had been employed as a 
government clerk, and claimed that he had been wrongfully dismissed, but the appellant 
argued that the Crown in New South Wales retained the power to dismiss civil servants at its 
pleasure. The respondent admitted that dismissal at pleasure was the traditional common law 
position, but relied on the Civil Service Act 1884 (NSW) as having transformed the position 
in New South Wales. Under that Act procedures were created for the suspension, demotion 
and dismissal of civil servants, and the Privy Council agreed with the respondent that those 
procedures were decisive:  
These provisions, which are manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of 
the officer, are inconsistent with importing into the contract of service the term 
that the Crown may put an end to it at its pleasure. In that case they would be 
superfluous, useless, and delusive. This is, in their Lordships’ opinion, an 
exceptional case, in which it has been deemed for the public good that a civil 
service should be established under certain regulations with some qualification of 
the members of it, and that some restriction should be imposed on the power of 
the Crown to dismiss them.
25 
The Crown was not to be allowed to fall back on its arbitrary common law powers when it 
had previously found it expedient to sign those powers away.    
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A similar theme could be seen in a cluster of cases in the 1880s on the Crown’s immunity 
from suit in contract and tort. In the first, Palmer v Hutchinson
26
, the Privy Council insisted 
on what was then the orthodox line that the Crown could not be liable for breach of contract, 
and neither could the Crown officer who had concluded the contract, unless he had contracted 
personally.
27
 In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Supreme Court of Natal had relied on 
the local practice of a public officer being sued on contracts made in his official capacity, and 
on an earlier Privy Council decision where it was assumed that such an action would lie.
28
 
Both factors were peremptorily dismissed by the Privy Council, in a decision that made it 
sound as if the position was simple.  
Shortly afterwards, however, in Hettihewage Siman Appu v Queen’s Advocate29, the Privy 
Council distinguished Palmer v Hutchinson when holding that the Crown could be sued for 
breach of contract in Ceylon. As in Palmer’s case, the claimant relied on a local practice of 
allowing the Crown to be sued, but the argument was better received than it had been in the 
earlier case. Here, the Privy Council emphasised, the case was different, because a local 
Ordinance of 1868 had recognised – albeit in general language – that such actions could be 
brought. Counsel for the Crown had suggested that some clearer statutory language was 
needed, and had emphasised that allowing claims against the Crown would be a radical 
departure from Ceylon’s Roman-Dutch roots, since it was “impossible” to suppose, in that 
system, that the monarch would “submit to the indignity of being sued”.30 The Privy 
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Council’s response was striking. Sixteenth century Scots procedural law, they pointed out, 
permitted the king to be sued via his officers – claims were thus not only possible, but had 
actually occurred – and, whilst it was true that no reported instances of claims against the 
monarch in Roman-Dutch law could be found, the absence of such claims was readily 
explicable by political circumstances rather than legal principles.
31
 In Ceylon, where 
claimants were less inhibited, the denial of a right to sue for breach of contract would be 
“inconvenient”, because the petition of right procedure – which was the means by which 
English claimants were able to bring contractual claims against the Crown – had never been 
extended to Ceylon.
32
 These historical and contextual factors cast new light on the Ceylonese 
courts’ practice of allowing claims: “Whatever may be the exact origin of the practice of 
suing the Crown, it was doubtless established to avoid such glaring injustice as would result 
from the entire inability of the subject to establish his claims”.33 
The most striking features of the Privy Council’s analysis here were its emphases on 
empiricism, relativism and local context. The apparently eternal truth that no monarch would 
submit to the indignity of actions in ordinary courts was first undermined by historical 
evidence, then repositioned as a statement of contingent political reality rather than legal 
principle, and finally declared inapplicable to Ceylon. It was an analysis that worked by 
methodically distancing itself from a proposition that was axiomatic for English lawyers (and 
would continue to be so until the Crown Proceedings Act 1947), and by substituting a rule 
that was responding to local conditions. 
The relativity of self-evident constitutional truths came to the fore in the final two cases of 
the cluster. Both concerned the proposition – it was almost a slogan – that “the King could do 
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no wrong”.34 The first, Farnell v Bowman35 was an appeal from New South Wales, where the 
Supreme Court had been divided over whether the Claims Against the Government Act 1876 
(NSW) permitted tort claims to be brought against the government.
36
 Martin CJ took the view 
that the statutory wording was insufficiently clear. “It is one of the undoubted prerogatives of 
the Crown”, he said, “not to be sued for damages in an action ex delicto, and neither that nor 
any other of the prerogatives can be taken away by implication”.37 He also took the 
opportunity to deliver some bracing remarks about New South Wales’ status – “The 
government of this British colony”, he explained, “however much ignorant people may be 
unable to comprehend it, is still the Government of the Queen”.38 Martin CJ’s colleague 
Faucett J seems to have been one of those “ignorant people”: for him, the reference in the Act 
to “Her Majesty’s local Government” meant the Governor and Executive Council. He also 
disagreed with Martin CJ on the issue of statutory construction, taking the view that the broad 
language of the section, which included the phrase “any just claim or demand whatever”, had 
to embrace claims in tort. This interpretation was confirmed by a consideration of the local 
context:  
when we consider the great variety of transactions which the Colonial 
Government undertakes and carries on, the old maxim seems in a large degree 
inapplicable to the state of things existing here, and we must presume that the 
Legislature, having this state of things in view, altered the law to meet the altered 
circumstances. 
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Windeyer J tentatively agreed with Faucett J. 
The Privy Council upheld the majority’s decision and echoed the emphasis on the statutory 
language. It also agreed with, and elaborated on, the point about the range of governmental 
activities:
39
 
It must be borne in mind that the local Governments in the Colonies, as pioneers 
of improvements, are frequently obliged to embark in undertakings which in other 
countries are left to private enterprise, such, for instance, as the construction of 
railways, canals, and other works for the construction of which it is necessary to 
employ many inferior officers and workmen. If, therefore, the maxim that “the 
king can do no wrong” were applied to Colonial Governments in the way now 
contended for by the appellants, it would work greater hardship than it does in 
England. 
The essential point in this passage was the same as the point made by Faucett J in the court 
below, but, when the two expositions are placed side by side, two telling differences can be 
seen. First, there is a difference in assumed audience. Faucett J speaks of “the state of things 
existing here”, and is implicitly addressing fellow Australians. The Privy Council seems to 
have a different audience in view – the analysis is couched in terms of justifying a departure 
from traditional English precepts, and “It must be borne in mind…” sounds like an attempt to 
forestall implicitly English objections. The assumed audience here is a sceptical English one. 
The second difference is the breadth of the reasoning. Where Faucett J speaks of “the 
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Colonial Government”, the Privy Council talks of “the local Governments in the Colonies”; 
Faucett J’s specific contrast between New South Wales and England becomes a general 
analytical tool for use anywhere in the Empire. Less than a year later, in Attorney-General of 
the Straits Settlement v Wemyss
40
, the Privy Council had no hesitation in applying it to a 
claim arising from government reclamation works in Penang. “In the case of Farnell v 
Bowman”, the Board recalled, 
attention was directed by this Committee to the fact that in many colonies the 
Crown was in the habit of undertaking works which, in England, are usually 
performed by private persons, and to the consequent expediency of providing 
remedies for injuries committed in the course of these works. The present case is 
an illustration of that remark. And there is no improbability, but the reverse, that 
when the legislature of a Colony in such circumstances allows claims against the 
Crown in words applicable to claims upon torts, it should mean exactly what it 
expresses.
41 
It followed that a tort claim against the government was authorised by a local Ordinance that 
permitted claims against the Crown “for damages or compensation arising in the Colony”. 
Again, a comparison of the Board’s language with the terms used by Faucett J to make the 
same basic point is revealing: for Faucett J New South Wales was the exception to the “old 
maxim”; for the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Straits Settlement v Wemyss, by 
contrast, England was the odd one out. The essential point may have been the same, but its 
emphasis had been reversed, its tone had been transformed, and its logic now pointed towards 
a reform of the English doctrine. 
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Many of the most interesting features of the cases considered in this section can be seen as 
responses to the difficulty of distance. Privy Council members seem to have been particularly 
anxious about appearing to be out of touch, and went out of their way to emphasise their 
grasp of local conditions. The results could occasionally look odd – as in Farnell v Bowman, 
where the Privy Council was far more respectful of New South Wales’ autonomy than its 
own Chief Justice had been – but the determination to support colonial self-determination 
was both consistent and admirable. There was also quite a radical undertone to some of the 
jurisprudence. For, even though the cases were technically limited to the interpretation of 
foreign legislation, the Privy Council’s underlying scepticism about Crown immunity from 
claims in contract and tort was obvious. In some ways the most challenging aspect of these 
decisions was not so much their rationes as their invocation of increasing government 
activity to support the conclusion that Crown immunities had been abandoned: the 
implication was, that, far from being universal or self-evident truths, Crown immunities were 
contingent on political environments. That was a message with quite startling implications 
beyond the colonial context. 
  
4. Colonial Experience 
The cases discussed in the previous section did not only share common ideas; they were 
heard by very similarly constituted panels. Sir Richard Couch delivered the Board’s reasons 
in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Rennie and Gould v Stuart, as well as sitting in 
Palmer v Hutchinson, Hettihewage Siman Appu v Queen’s Advocate and Bowman v Farnell. 
Lord Hobhouse sat in every case, and gave the Board’s reasons in both Hettihewage Siman 
Appu v Queen’s Advocate and Attorney-General of the Straits Settlement v Wemyss. Sir 
Barnes Peacock wrote for the Board in Palmer v Hutchinson and Bowman v Farnell; he also 
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sat in Attorney-General of the Straits Settlement v Wemyss. These judges were hardly 
household names – even in legal households – indeed, Couch’s obituarist would begin his 
tribute with the statement that “Sir Richard Couch was one of a class of public servants 
whose work is of truly Imperial importance, but completely fails to attain anything like 
popular recognition”.42 That was not to say, however, that they were unqualified, or amateurs. 
At least part of the explanation for their obscurity in England was the fact that they had had 
distinguished careers in India. 
Peacock had become Legal Member of the Supreme Council of the Viceroy at Calcutta in 
1852, and held that post for seven years before being appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Calcutta. He remained Chief Justice for eleven years and was succeeded by Sir 
Richard Couch.
43
 At the time of his appointment, Couch already had eight years’ Indian 
judicial experience as, first, a judge, then Chief Justice, of the High Court of Bombay.
44
 
While serving as Chief Justice in Calcutta he had met and became friends with Hobhouse, 
who became Legal Member of the Viceroy’s Council in 1872, and retained that post for five 
years.
45
 The advantages of all three men’s Indian experience were most obvious in Indian 
appeals on questions of family law or inheritance law (where Hindu or Muslim religious laws 
still applied); Peacock, for instance, was particularly noted for his knowledge of Indian 
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customs. But the more difficult – and intriguing – question concerns the extent to which their 
Indian experiences might have informed their attitudes to appeals from non-Indian 
jurisdictions. For, as we have seen, and as contemporary commentators noted appreciatively, 
both Couch and Hobhouse (and, to a lesser extent, Peacock), threw themselves 
wholeheartedly into the Privy Council’s work, and clearly did not regard themselves as 
exclusively Indian specialists.
46
 Peacock’s is perhaps the most striking case, since he began 
his Indian duties in the very year that the British position in India was rocked by the 
Mutiny.
47
 The Mutiny’s immediate cause was the supply of cartridges greased with a mixture 
of cow’s fat and pork lard to Indian soliders, and some commentators sought to portray the 
uprising and its aftermath as an isolated, and regrettable misunderstanding on a specific issue. 
But more critical analysts identified as underlying causes the ignorance and arrogance of the 
British authorities, especially those of the East India Company with its transparently 
commercial motivations. As one of those analysts, Herbert Cowell, later put it, “the Mutiny is 
the important date at which the whole character of our relations with India underwent a great 
organic change.”48  
Cowell was in an excellent position to know. For, although when he wrote these words in 
1897 he was the Privy Council’s law reporter (and occasionally an advocate before it), rather 
like Peacock, Couch and Hobhouse, he had a distinguished Indian career behind him, the 
centrepiece of which was his tenure of the inaugural Tagore Professorship at the University 
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of Calcutta from 1869 to 1872.
49
 Cowell’s duties as Professor were defined in the will of the 
donor as being to “read or deliver yearly, at some place within the town of Calcutta, one 
complete course of law lectures, without charge to the students and other persons who may 
attend such lectures.”50 His first course, on the court system of India, went through six 
editions, and was described as “something of an Indian legal classic”.51 The second and third 
courses, on Hindu family, adoption, property and succession law were equally well received: 
the second course was hailed as “a model of what a treatise on Hindu law should be”52, and 
the third as “quite equal in value” to its predecessor.53 Cowell’s assessment of the period 
immediately following the Mutiny was that it was “one of great legislative activity, of 
numerous codes of law, designed to weld together as far as possible the heterogeneous 
populations of the empire”.54 The latter point was particularly important – these legislative 
activities were not to be seen as attempts to impose an alien system on an insubordinate 
population. Indeed, for Cowell, crass attempts to impose British ways had been almost 
catastrophic: as he described the scene on the eve of the Mutiny, “We were inflated by our 
power… and were proportionately more dogmatic than compromising in introducing Western 
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reforms and curing Oriental practices by our views of what is sound, regardless of native 
ideas and tradition.”55 
What Cowell described as a period of “great legislative activity… designed to weld together 
as far as possible the heterogeneous populations of the empire” began with Peacock’s tenure 
as the Law Member of the Viceroy’s Council. His subsequent judicial career, like Couch’s, 
was played out in an environment in which judges could not but have been aware of the 
sensitivity their roles required, and the delicacy of their task. Hobhouse’s position was 
obviously different, in that he held no Indian judicial post; and by the time of his appointment 
to the Viceroy’s Council the enthusiasm for legislation had subsided. He was however, a 
thoughtful and perceptive observer of the Indian situation, and acutely aware of the 
difficulties of creating appropriate legislation.
56
 If Kipling’s short story, “Tods’ Amendment” 
is anything to go by, Law Members’ anxiety about their proposals irritating the local 
population continued well after Hobhouse’s time.57 In that story, first published ten years 
after Hobhouse had left India, an ambitious legislative initiative is recast after a child tells the 
Law Member what he has heard local people saying about the measure. The story may, 
perhaps, try too hard to be charming
58
; but both the central premiss of its plot – that the 
Legislative Council’s self-confidence on such issues was cripplingly fragile – and the wider 
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absurdity of undertaking law reform with no real method of knowing what the local 
population either wanted or needed, have the ring of truth about them. 
The late nineteenth century Privy Council decisions on colonial governance, in which 
Peacock, Couch and Hobhouse took such leading roles, surely carry the hallmark of these 
judges’ Indian experiences. There is an instinctive refusal to have recourse to English 
doctrines as default solutions, and a corresponding concern both to take account of colonial 
conditions, and to signal that those conditions had determined the outcome of the case. There 
is also an awareness of the importance of supporting (and, thereby, both stabilising and 
strengthening) local representative government. Perhaps most strikingly, there is a 
determination not to allow governments to act in a high-handed, unaccountable way – for 
instance, by the judges’ insistence that the Crown can commit a tort, and be liable for it, in 
the colonies. India offered them an all too vivid reminder of where unchecked executive 
arrogance could lead. 
 
5. The Composition of the Court 
Peacock, Couch and Hobhouse embodied a particular kind of expertise. Their dominance, 
confidence and – particularly in the case of Hobhouse – omnipresence in the Privy Council in 
the later nineteenth century might give the impression that the value of such expertise was 
universally recognised. But in fact the Privy Council had, from the very outset, had an 
ambivalent attitude towards expertise, and once Couch and Hobhouse had retired in 1901, 
Peacock having died in 1894, there was a notable absence of colonial experience and 
expertise on the Judicial Committee. 
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The Privy Council’s ambivalent attitude towards expertise could be traced all the way back to 
Brougham’s 1828 speech. There he had highlighted that one aspect of the difficulty of 
distance was the inevitability of difficult cases from foreign systems coming “before the 
necessarily ignorant privy councillor, after the learned doctors of each [jurisdiction] have 
differed”.59 His proposed solution, however, was not quite what we might have expected: 
“The judges should be men of the largest legal and general information, accustomed to study 
other systems of law beside our own, and associated with lawyers who have practised and 
presided in the colonial courts.”60 The experienced colonial specialists, in other words, were 
not to be Privy Council judges, they were to work with those judges in some unspecified way. 
When Brougham had the opportunity to realise his proposals for reforming the Privy Council, 
he retained this arms-length distance between decision-making and expertise, by specifying 
in s 30 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 that two former colonial judges might be 
appointed to “attend the Sittings” of the Committee; the membership of the Committee had 
been set out in s 1 of the Act, in a series of criteria that emphasised high judicial experience 
in English courts.  
The colonial judges appointed under s 30 of the 1833 Act became known as “assessors”, and 
were typically called on in appeals from India. They included highly respected individuals of 
undoubted intellectual ability, such as Sir Lawrence Peel, who had been Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Calcutta from 1842 to 1855.
61
 Unfortunately, a lack of sources makes it 
impossible to assess the assessors’ contribution62, but it is worth noting that, as part of a 
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wide-ranging critique of English judicial dealings with Hindu law, W C Petheram, a former 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, particularly regretted the statutory abolition 
of assessors.
63
 Their role was invaluable, Petheram argued, when the Privy Council was 
called upon – as it often would be under Hindu and Muslim law – to identify a prevailing 
local custom. In such circumstances an assessor might be able to make inquiries that could 
not properly be undertaken by a judge in the case. 
The potential for colonial judges to play a more central role in the decisions of the Privy 
Council occurred in 1871, when the Judicial Committee Act provided for four new judicial 
posts. The Act had a troubled history and a sharply contested passage through Parliament, 
neither of which could be obviously explained by its mundane, rather pedestrian provisions. 
As both its history and the debates surrounding it demonstrated, however, the proposal to 
appoint four new judges to the Privy Council, and even the terms of the new appointments, 
brought to the surface some of the conflicting aspirations, ideologies and fantasies about the 
Privy Council that were normally left to swirl around its operations unarticulated. At the heart 
of these disputes were questions about technical expertise, professionalization and the 
symbolic significance of remuneration for Privy Council judges. 
What made such legislation necessary was the number of Privy Council appeals from India, 
which had climbed so steeply in the 1860s as to overwhelm the Privy Council’s working 
methods.
64
 In 1870 Lord Westbury brought it to the House of Lords’ attention that there were 
370 outstanding Privy Council appeals, which, by his calculations, would take an ordinary 
court of common law two years to get through. This was bad enough, but the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, as then constituted, could never have achieved such 
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productivity: pursuant to s 1 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833, the majority of its members 
already held high judicial offices that occupied most of their time. 
The obvious solution was to reinforce the Privy Council with judges who could devote their 
energies to clearing the backlog, and in July 1870 Lord Hatherley LC introduced a Bill into 
the House of Lords which was designed to achieve that result.
65
 The Bill provided for the 
appointment of four new members of the Judicial Committee. Two were to be either former 
judges of any High Court in India or a former Law Member of the Viceroy’s Council, and 
were to receive a salary of £1,000. The second two were to be either former judges of the 
Supreme Court of any possession other than India, or barristers of at least fifteen years’ 
standing. These second two judges were each to receive £2,500 a year in salary.  The Bill also 
provided for the appointment of retired English judges, at a salary of £500 a year. Hatherley 
clearly anticipated that the details of his proposals would be controversial: as he introduced 
the Bill for its Second Reading, he was already prepared to restrict the Indian judicial 
qualifications to former Chief Justices, since, as he explained, “There had been intimated to 
him some objections with reference to the appointment in the first instance of the Judges in 
any Court in India, and it had been suggested that in some Courts there were native Judges 
whom it would not be desirable to appoint as members of the Judicial Committee.”66 
Lord Cairns immediately voiced different anxieties. For him, the eligibility of even former 
Chief Justices of smaller colonies went too far: “the consequences”, he pointed out, “might be 
the appointment of the Chief Justices of Sierra Leone, the Straits Settlements, Gambia, the 
Mauritius, or any of the Colonies whose Chief Justices were of a different stamp from those 
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whom it was desirable to appoint on the Judicial Committee”.67 This was hardly flattering to 
the current holders of those posts. The proposal to pay £500 to retired English judges was 
also objectionable, but for different reasons. There was, he said, “an ample scale of retiring 
pensions for Judges, and attached to the receipt of those pensions there was always 
considered to be the obligation – no doubt an imperfect one – to give some portion of their 
time to the transaction of the judicial business of the country”.68 Introducing a practice of 
payment, he concluded, would destroy “the honourable understanding which now 
prevailed”.69 
Before we go on to consider how the 1870 Bill fared in subsequent debates it is worth 
pausing to register the significance of the proposals and the immediate moves responding to 
them. As it stood the Bill was very obviously shaped by anxieties about the difficulty of 
distance. The emphasis on former Indian judges was partly explained by the severe backlog 
of Indian appeals, but the intention to appoint two such judges alongside judges from other 
colonies showed that, at least in some quarters, there was a belief that what the Privy Council 
needed was an infusion of new members with colonial experience. Hatherley’s concession on 
Indian judges, and Cairns’ concerns about colonial Chief Justices suggested a contrasting 
underlying conception of the Privy Council. For them it was not all about local knowledge 
and experience, nor could it be about making the Privy Council a kind of facsimile of an 
appellate court for whichever jurisdiction an appeal came from – it that were so, the native 
judges and colonial chief justices would have been a perfect fit. What exactly Lord Hatherley 
and Lord Cairns had in mind is more difficult to pin down. Their objections could, it is true, 
simply be read as expressions of racism and intellectual snobbery respectively, but it might 
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be possible – and also more interesting – to relate their concerns to the difficulty of distance. 
Both men could be seen as saying that over-enthusiastic attempts to eliminate distance would 
be counter-productive, and result in the appointment of individuals who were either partisan, 
or unable to appreciate the Privy Council’s role as an imperial institution, in which breadth of 
view and an awareness of political sensitivities were at least as important as technical 
expertise. They may, in short, both have felt that a certain distance was essential for the Privy 
Council to perform its role.  
When the House of Lords considered the Bill at the Committee stage, attention focussed on 
its financial aspects. Like Lord Cairns, Lord Romilly opposed the proposal to pay retired 
English judges £500 a year, but his reasons were very different from Lord Cairns’. Romilly’s 
basic position was that there was a direct relationship between remuneration and quality of 
service, and it was “perfectly ridiculous” to think that £500 would be enough to secure judges 
“such as would inspire confidence among the public and the profession both at home and 
abroad”.70 He also had his doubts about whether £2,500 would be enough to tempt barristers 
of the requisite calibre away from practice.
71
 Lord Cairns agreed, pointing out that English 
puisne judges currently received £5,000; if £2,500 was an adequate attraction, he added, 
mischievously, “the judicial salaries paid in this country ought at once to be reduced by one-
half”.72 
By the time the Bill came to be considered in the Commons, what was described as “very 
general objection… in the legal profession”73 to the proposal to appoint experienced 
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barristers had resulted in that part of the Bill being dropped. But what was left was still 
controversial. The Bill, it was said, “went to degrade one of the greatest Courts in the 
country”74, and would make an addition to the Privy Council which “was not equal to the 
elements of which it is now composed”.75 Henry James MP (later, as Lord James of Hereford, 
a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary) singled out the proposal to include former Law Members of 
the Viceroy’s Council – “With the greatest respect to Mr Maine”, he said, using that formula 
that lets listeners know to brace themselves for something disrespectful, “a gentleman whose 
great learning was admitted, he could not think that the proposal to put among the Judges of 
the Judicial Committee a gentleman who had had no judicial experience was at all a 
satisfactory one”.76 Hobhouse’s universally acclaimed service on the Judicial Committee in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century would put such casual dismissals in their 
proper light. 
A more considered, compelling attack on the Bill came from Watkin Williams MP. Like his 
colleagues, he feared that the proposals would diminish the Privy Council’s status, but, rather 
than confining himself to vague generalisations, he was careful to explain why he thought 
that the current court had such high standing. The Judicial Committee, he said,  
had exercised its functions not only to the satisfaction of the suitors, but had so 
advised the Crown in its actions as to place the Committee in the very foremost 
rank as an appellate tribunal. Its advice and reports were held both in America 
and France, as well as in England, as judgments of the highest legal authority; and 
he ventured to say that there was no Appellate Court in the world – none certainly 
in England – that could for one moment stand side by side as regarded reputation 
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with that great Court. There was no pretence for saying that the House of Lords 
could be compared with the Judicial Committee in that respect; perhaps one 
reason was that the Judicial Committee gave their advice to the Crown upon 
grounds of plain justice and common sense unfettered by technicalities.
77
 
The trouble with the Bill, he explained, was that it made belonging to this distinguished 
tribunal “a matter of money”:  
Men of the greatest attainments looked to this position as the highest distinction 
that could be conferred upon them in recognition of public services, great 
learning, and proved judicial qualifications. But, by making it a question of 
money, the whole system was altered, and the existing attraction done away 
with… There was something which, even to lawyers, was more than money, and 
that was the honourable recognition of the legal ability, learning, and judicial 
qualifications requisite for the highest appellate tribunal.
78
 
Watkin Williams’ assessment of the Privy Council, and his criticism of the Bill’s proposals 
were highly suggestive. The Privy Council was depicted as enjoying an enviable international 
prestige, even in jurisdictions that fell outside its remit, and as being unquestionably ahead of 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in its standing. Part of the reason for its 
success, apparently, was its reliance on “plain justice and common sense unfettered by 
technicalities”. In this assessment there was no emphasis on local knowledge or legal 
expertise in foreign systems – indeed, on Watkin Williams’ analysis such factors might tend 
to distract the court from what had made it such a success. The same theme shaped Watkin 
Williams’ objections to the Bill: there was nothing in his comments to suggest that he thought 
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particular kinds of expertise or colonial experience were either necessary or desirable in Privy 
Council judges. On the contrary, appointment to the Privy Council was seen as an honour 
with congenial duties attached. To put it in terms of distance, on Watkin Williams’ view 
distance did not matter; the secret of the Privy Council’s success was that it dispensed plain 
justice and common sense, and those two commodities were the same the world over. 
Despite valiant attempts by Gladstone, who appealed to the House’s “character for justice and 
business habits”79, the government could only muster a bare majority in favour of the 
proposals, and the Bill had to be abandoned. The backlog of appeals increased, and less than 
a year later Lord Westbury sought to force the issue, by demanding the introduction of a Bill 
within ten days.
80
 There were now, he claimed, four hundred appeal cases waiting. In the 
course of his speech Westbury pointed out that there were murmurings of discontent in the 
colonies; he quoted from an article in the Melbourne Argus that complained about the delays, 
and which continued “All we ask is that our suits shall be decided by a fully organized 
English Court, and not by some stray legal casuals.”81 The latter phrase was perhaps a 
disparaging reference to the broad categories of eligibility in the failed 1870 Bill; but the 
more eye-catching point was at the start of the sentence: this Australian writer wanted a 
proper English court to decide Australian appeals. It was as if, paradoxically, the presence of 
anyone other than English judges somehow devalued the court. 
Hatherley’s immediate response to Westbury’s demands was to prevaricate. But eleven days 
later (and we might wonder whether he was making a subtle point with this timing) he 
introduced the Judicial Committee Bill 1871.
82
 The Bill proposed to appoint four new Privy 
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Council judges, who must have been either judges of the Superior Courts at Westminster, or 
Chief Justices of Bengal, Madras or Bombay. These criteria were obviously far narrower than 
those in the earlier proposal, and prompted no objections in the Bill’s passage through both 
Houses, although Lord Westbury suggested that “ultimately” Irish and Scottish judges should 
be eligible for such positions.
83
 As it turned out, however, the real controversy would come 
when the Act was implemented. Sir James Colvile and Sir Barnes Peacock accepted two of 
the posts, and Sir Montague Smith, previously of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster 
took the third. The fourth appointment, however, was problematic: no Westminster court 
judge wanted it
84
, so Gladstone, in desperation, appointed his Attorney General, Robert 
Collier, to a vacant position in the Court of Common Pleas before translating him to the Privy 
Council after two days.
85
 The “Collier Juggle”, as it became known, is perhaps more 
significant as an episode in Gladstone’s political career than in the history of the Privy 
Council
86
, but, even so, it still casts some light on contemporary attitudes to the Privy 
Council’s role. For what is striking from the legal perspective is that, although the Lord 
Chancellor envisaged appointing two judges with English judicial backgrounds and two from 
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India
87
, the Act allowed more flexibility by providing simply for four new judges, each of 
whom had to meet one of the criteria (whether English or Indian) for appointment.
88
 There 
was, in other words, no necessity to have manufactured a candidate with English judicial 
qualifications. That Gladstone chose to do so, rather than appointing a third judge with high 
Indian experience, may suggest that, for him, it was essential to maintain a symmetry 
between home and colonial perspectives in the Privy Council. 
The 1871 Act marked the end of attempts systematically to integrate colonial judges into the 
Privy Council. The question of who ought to sit in the Judicial Committee quickly became 
caught up in broader debates about appellate jurisdiction more generally; one result of those 
debates was the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, which provided for the appointment of four 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who would hear both House of Lords and Privy Council 
appeals. The 1876 Act provided for two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary to be appointed 
immediately; the third to be appointed on the death or resignation of two of the appointees 
under the 1871 Act; and the fourth once the final two 1871 Act appointees were out of the 
picture. This shift in the balance of power did not go unnoticed. As the Times observed on the 
occasion of the death of Sir James Colvile in 1880, his loss was irreparable in a special sense. 
His service as, first, a judge, and then as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Bengal had 
given him an enviable grasp of Indian law, which he combined with “an understanding of the 
spirit of universal justice”.89 But these were not unique qualities – they could also be found 
among former Law Members of the Viceroy’s Council, for instance. “It is not the dearth of 
competent successors”, the Times explained, “but legislation which has rendered SIR JAMES 
COLVILE’S loss irreparable, by providing that it shall not be repaired… Starving the 
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Supreme Court of Appeal for the whole of the residue of the Empire seems a roundabout way 
of securing an efficient Appeal Court for Scotland and Ireland.”90 
  
6. Universal Principles 
In the years after 1876, the Privy Council’s pretensions to expertise in the systems from 
which it heard appeals inevitably became more tenuous. That might have appeared to 
undermine its authority; but the fact that the Privy Council did not suffer any marked loss of 
respect indicates that other strategies for negotiating the difficulty of distance were being 
successfully resorted to. One of the most interesting, and frequently used, of those strategies 
was the attempt to transcend distance by an appeal to general, transnational principles. 
This judicial technique was described with particular eloquence by Lord Haldane, who, as 
well as being a member of the Judicial Committee from 1911, had had an extensive practice 
before the court prior to that.
91
 We saw earlier that Haldane had enormous admiration for 
Lord Watson, whom he described as “the Privy Council judge par excellence”92. Haldane’s 
admiration stemmed partly from Watson’s apparent ability to become a lawyer of the system 
from which the appeal was brought; but he was also deeply impressed by Watson’s general 
legal abilities. “Fine legal intelligence”, observed Haldane,  
even in a comparatively unfamiliar field, is better than the understanding whose 
main qualification is only special knowledge. The jurisprudence of all countries is 
much the same in its fundamental principles. Strip it of its technical terminology, 
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and the differences in great measure disappear. The master of legal principle who 
has a mind large enough to be free from provincialism is, therefore, in all cases 
the best kind of judge.
93 
Haldane was speaking in 1900, and, given the relatively recent controversies surrounding the 
appointment of colonial judges to the Privy Council, his remarks are particularly striking:  
rather than regretting the loss of specialist expertise among the judges, expertise was here 
being presented as inhibiting, narrowing, and halfway to provincialism. 
Twenty years later, in a similar address, Haldane returned to the same theme: 
The Judges try to look for the common principle underlying systems of 
jurisprudence of differing kinds. They know that the form often veils over a very 
similar substance. We are constantly finding that, where great broad principles of 
justice are concerned you find – veiled, but still there, and only distinguished by 
technicalities – the same substance as belongs to other systems. The human mind 
is much the same all the world over.
94
 
In some ways this passage is even more suggestive than his earlier remarks. He was now a 
judge – hence the slide from the third person to the first – and though he began his talk with 
some light-hearted comments about keeping the Privy Council’s secrets, he obviously found 
the occasion congenial, and it may be relevant that he had not planned to publish the text of 
what he said.
95
 His comments showed how far he was from thinking that specialism, or 
expertise in a particular system, were advantages: on the contrary, an immersion in the 
technicalities was to be avoided, and the veils thrust aside. The last sentence of the passage 
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was particularly resonant: if the universal identity of the human mind was the starting point, 
the difficulty of distance disappeared. 
The attraction of appealing to universal principles of justice was particularly strong when 
social conditions and legal concepts were remote from those applying in England. Two 
examples from the Indian appeal cases on duress and undue influence show how such  
universal concepts could be invoked, with varying degrees of success. In Prem Narain Singh 
v Parasram Singh
96
 the appellants sought to set aside an agreement under which they had 
transferred a half share of property inherited from their grandfather to their uncles and 
cousins. The property had previously been held by the appellants’ grandmother; after her 
death, the defendants arrived with a large body of retainers, and took possession. There were 
“serious apprehensions of affray”97, and government officers had to be sent to keep the peace. 
A “punchayet” was then held, at which the arbitrators were the father-in-law of the eldest 
appellant and two neighbouring “zemindars”. None of the Indian terms were explained in the 
Privy Council’s reasons, but a punchayet was a kind of mediation, and a zemindar a local 
landowner. The outcome of the punchayet was an ikrarnamah (again, unexplained in the 
reasons – it meant a formal undertaking) to transfer the half-share. The appellants then went 
before a criminal court, where they made depositions stating that they had been charged with 
unlawful assembly, that they denied the charge, and that the transfer of the property had been 
made as a compromise. Having explained the facts, the Privy Council then proceeded to 
apply the law:  
Looking at the whole case, the main features of it appear to be these: These young 
men execute a deed, whereby they part with a half of their property. It is, in their 
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Lordships’ view, executed without any consideration whatever. It is executed 
very shortly after they had come to their property, and when it may be considered 
as at all events doubtful whether they were fully acquainted with their rights; 
indeed the evidence in the case tends to shew that they were not fully acquainted 
with their rights. At the time of the execution of a most important document they 
do not appear to have had any professional advice; and, further, the appearance of 
their uncles with a large force, the possession which was taken of their property, 
the criminal proceedings, and the other circumstances which have been referred 
to, constituted a state of things likely to overawe them, and materially to affect 
the free exercise of their will.
98
 
The effect of this paragraph is a linguistic jolt. Up to this point the events had been described 
in a way which made no concessions to readers unfamiliar with Indian terminology. But 
when it came to the legal analysis, the “main features” of the case were articulated in such 
classical English legal language as to sound faintly ridiculous. There is also a troubling sense 
that by forcing the factual situation into English legal categories the “main features” of the 
case were misidentified as being all about the appellants’ exercise of their contractual 
freedoms. A different way of characterising the case would have focussed on the appellants’ 
attempts to renege on the outcome of a local mediation. Indeed, it might be tempting to say 
that the “main feature” of the case was the delicate issue about the extent to which different, 
local traditions of resolving disputes should be respected. The Privy Council’s approach to 
the case as a question of undue influence inevitably pushed the issue of legal pluralism to one 
side. 
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A more convincing invocation of universal principles could be seen in Moung Shoay Att v Ko 
Byaw
99
, an appeal from the Special Court of British Burma. Here the question was whether a 
sale of timber at an exorbitant price was void for duress, with the alleged duress taking the 
form of a violent arrest, beating and imprisonment of the buyer’s agent by a Burmese officer, 
following a complaint about the agent’s conduct by the seller. The agent had agreed to the 
sale after this ordeal. The Privy Council felt able – although with some caution – to have 
recourse to general principles, saying that: 
No doubt, speaking generally, all matters relating to a contract are to be decided 
by the law of the country where the contract is made, but there are principles of 
universal application by which all contracts, wherever made, must be judged. The 
first principle of contracts is, that there should be voluntary consent to it.
100
 
However, at the same time, great care was taken to signal that the judges appreciated the 
importance of local conditions. One of the arguments that had been addressed to them was 
that since the Burmese officer’s imprisonment of the agent was lawful, the buyer could not 
rely on it as duress. The judges’ response to this argument was quick to distinguish between 
England and Burma:  
in this country if a man is under lawful imprisonment for a civil debt, an 
agreement which he makes while subject to that constraint is not, by reason of his 
being so subject to it, capable of being avoided, provided that it is not 
unconscionable. But imprisonment in a country where there is no settled system 
of law or procedure, and where the judge is invested with arbitrary powers, is 
duress of a wholly different kind. In the one case the prisoner knows that the 
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length and severity of his imprisonment are defined and limited by the law, and 
cannot be exceeded; whereas in the other the prisoner neither knows what will be 
the length of his imprisonment, nor what amount of pain and misery he may be 
put to; all is indefinite; and therefore the apprehension acting on the mind of a 
man in such a situation would be infinitely greater than if he were imprisoned in a 
country like England, where the law is settled, and cannot be exceeded by the 
Judge.
101
 
The sale was, therefore, held to be void.  
Part of what made Moung Shoay Att v Ko Byaw a more convincing performance than 
Premain Narain Singh v Parasram Singh was its tone: the universal contractual principle on 
which reliance was to be placed was put forward almost diffidently, and wrapped in the 
reassuring acknowledgement that local law was paramount. There were no such 
presentational niceties in Singh’s case, where English legal categories were simply imposed. 
Of equal, perhaps greater importance, was the superior way in which Moung Shoay Att v Ko 
Byaw negotiated the difficulty of distance. In Singh’s case the facts were in Bengal, and the 
law was in London; but in Moung Shoay Att v Ko Byaw the judgment was nimbler, shuttling 
astutely between anglicised universal principles and Burmese particularities to craft an 
analysis that was strengthened by its interweaving of different strands. 
 
7. Policy 
For a court to be undertaking the identification and exposition of universal principles was, 
perhaps, unusual enough; but the Privy Council’s frequent and unabashed engagement with 
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questions of policy made it unique among English courts. A particularly vivid illustration, 
and one in which the connections between policy and distance were expressly articulated, 
was provided by Madras Railway Company v Zemindar of Carvatenagarum.
102 
The facts concerned an irrigation tank maintained by the defendant, which had burst 
following extraordinarily heavy rainfall in the monsoon season. The water escaped, damaging 
the claimant’s railway line, and the claimants sought compensation based on the then recent 
House of Lords’ decision in Rylands v Fletcher.103 Holloway CJ, hearing the case in the High 
Court of Madras, was appalled. In an unusually vigorous judgment rejecting the claim, he 
pointed out that the tanks had existed since “beyond living memory”, were “absolutely 
necessary to human existence, so far as it depends upon agriculture”, and that the imposition 
of liability would be “calamitous” for the local population.104 These instinctive expressions of 
alarm were accompanied by combative legal analysis. “A rule of law”, he said, “is not a rule 
for us, unless it is a correct rule, and it is quite possible that a rule excellent there may be 
wholly inapplicable here.”105 The particular rule he had in mind was the proposition that 
storage of a large quantity of water was a non-natural use of land, for the escape of which the 
owner of the land was strictly liable. This was, undeniably, the ratio decidendi of Rylands v 
Fletcher, but, as Holloway CJ pointed out, it did not travel well: 
The test here proposed is whether the accumulation took place in the course of the 
natural user of the close. Now it is very obvious that the most natural user of land 
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is for the purposes of agriculture, and that in England, until the summer of 1868, 
it never entered into the head of any Englishman that the storing up of large 
quantities of water could be essential to agriculture.
106 
Where the climate made storage of water necessary for agriculture, the rule subverted its own 
rationale. Holloway CJ had no doubt about which should prevail: “although not an 
immediate, national economy, wealth and prosperity, with all other objects of man’s ethical 
interests, are mediate sources of law.”107 It followed, therefore, that storage of water under 
these circumstances was a natural user, which could not give rise to liability under Rylands v 
Fletcher. This analysis was emphatic enough already, but Holloway CJ had, as it turned out, 
saved his most withering comments for a parting shot: “this attempt [to rely on Rylands v 
Fletcher] would never have been made if the final decision had rested with Judges conversant 
with the necessities of the country, and … it has only been made in the hope that such a rule 
may be imposed elsewhere by Judges not so conversant”.108 The claimants, he believed, were 
cynically hoping to exploit the Privy Council’s ignorance of Indian conditions for their own 
advantage. 
Holloway CJ’s colleague Innes J was less outspoken and preferred a different route to the 
denial of liability. For Innes J the key point was that the maintenance of these tanks was 
“impressed with the character of lawfulness”.109 It had obtained this character because 
elsewhere in India the state itself undertook maintenance of the tanks; the defendant was, 
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therefore, in the same position as people carrying on “dangerous trades and occupations in 
England for which there is legislative sanction”.110 
When the case was decided by the Privy Council, the less pugnacious approach of Innes J 
was preferred. The Judicial Committee was not persuaded that Rylands v Fletcher was 
inapplicable to India because, “decided as it was, on the application of the maxim, sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas, [it] express[ed] a principle recognized by the laws of all civilized 
countries”.111 That was not to say, however, that it was indistinguishable. Here the tanks 
formed part of a national system of irrigation the importance of which was universally 
acknowledged; the zemindars had a public duty to maintain them, which had no counterpart 
in the facts of Rylands v Fletcher. “The rights and liabilities of the Defendant”, the Board 
concluded, “appear to their Lordships much more analogous to those of persons or 
corporations on whom statutory powers have been conferred and statutory duties 
imposed.”112 
The Madras Railway case exemplifies virtually all of the fundamental themes of this essay. 
The difficulty arising from distance was recognised – even strenuously signalled – by 
Holloway CJ; the need for the common law to adapt in different physical and social 
circumstances was acknowledged; and the recourse to universal principles in order to give 
transnational authority to English legal rules was prominent. There was even, in Holloway 
CJ’s comments about the Privy Council’s ignorance of colonial conditions, an allusion to the 
vexed issue of judicial expertise. As things turned out, that was one issue on which Holloway 
CJ need not have been apprehensive, for later that same year the Judicial Committee Act 
would (as we have seen) clear the way for two former Indian Chief Justices to be appointed 
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to the Privy Council. But in one crucial respect the Madras Railway case highlighted a 
further, potentially deeply controversial aspect of the Privy Council’s work, which was its 
readiness to decide cases on policy grounds. Here, for all the attention-grabbing pungency of 
Holloway CJ’s judgment, Innes J and the Privy Council were doing something 
extraordinarily radical: they were granting an exemption from liability as if there were a 
statute authorising the activity when no such statute actually existed. It was, in effect, nothing 
less than the creation of a public interest exception.  
It is perhaps surprising that more has not been made of the Madras Railway case, especially 
in view of the continuing fraught relationship between liability in nuisance and questions of 
public interest.
113
 It may, perhaps, have been a victim of law reporting conventions, with its 
appearance in the Indian Appeal Cases series being taken as a sign that it was of Indian 
interest only. Certainly that is how it seems to be seen today
114
, but it is interesting to note 
that Pollock, at least, registered its significance for the general principles of English law.
115 
A revealing contrast can be made in this respect with Victorian Railway Commissioners v 
Coultas
116
, another Privy Council decision in which tort liability was controlled by policy 
factors. The appeal was from the Supreme Court of Victoria, and concerned a claim in 
negligence for shock suffered when, owing to a gate-keeper’s negligence, the claimant was 
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nearly hit by a train. The Australian court had thought the claim a legitimate one
117
, but the 
Privy Council’s view, in reasons delivered by Sir Richard Couch, was very different: the 
damages were held to be too remote to be recovered, but the language used indicated that this 
was, in effect, a policy decision. Allowing the claimant to recover here, it was said, would 
“result in a wide field being opened for imaginary claims”.118 The Privy Council’s decision 
inspired the creation of a new rule of liability – the rule in Wilkinson v Downton119 – which 
attempted to circumvent the denial of liability by awarding damages where the defendant’s 
mental state was (slightly) more culpable than negligence. Later English courts also hesitated 
to endorse the Privy Council’s confident dismissal of such claims.120 The Privy Council, it 
seemed, had greater freedom to manoeuvre on policy matters than its English counterparts. 
 
8. Refusing to Decide 
Perhaps the best known examples of the Privy Council exercising such freedom in cases of 
policy occurred in the second half of the twentieth century when, beginning with Australian 
Consolidated Press Limited v Uren
121
, the Privy Council decided that there were, in effect, 
some cases that it could not legitimately decide. The Australian Consolidated Press case 
concerned the availability of exemplary damages in claims for defamation. In England the 
circumstances in which such damages could be recovered had been dramatically curtailed by 
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the House of Lords’ decision in Rookes v Barnard122 a couple of years earlier, but Australian 
courts were minded to retain the earlier position. The matter came to a head when the High 
Court of Australia ruled that exemplary damages were available for insolent, vindictive, 
outrageous or high-handed disregard of the claimant’s rights, and that the Rookes v Barnard 
categories should not be applied in Australia.
123
 The Privy Council dismissed the appeal, 
saying that:   
in a sphere of the law where its policy calls for decision and where its policy in a 
particular country is fashioned so largely by judicial opinion it became a question 
for the High Court to decide whether the decision in Rookes v Barnard compelled 
a change in what was a well settled judicial approach to the law of libel in 
Australia. Their Lordships are not prepared to say that the High Court were 
wrong in being unconvinced that a changed approach in Australia was 
desirable.
124 
The same underlying theme could be seen in Lange v Atkinson
125
, another Privy Council 
appeal on defamation, which raised questions about the extent of the protection offered by the 
common law to political expression in New Zealand. As in the Australian Consolidated Press 
case, the Privy Council felt unable to adjudicate, saying that  
striking a balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation 
calls for a value judgment which depends upon local political and social 
conditions. These conditions include matters such as the responsibility and 
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vulnerability of the press… For some years their Lordships’ Board has recognised 
the limitations on its role as an appellate tribunal in cases where the decision 
depends upon considerations of local public policy.
126 
There can be no doubt that this was a highly significant line of cases, but it may be doubted 
whether, as one commentator observed of the Australian Consolidated Press case, it 
represented “an apparent change in the Board’s conception of its role as an appellate 
tribunal”.127 Nearly fifty years earlier, Lord Haldane had written admiringly of the Judicial 
Committee’s skilful refusal to adjudicate on a delicate issue that had arisen on an appeal from 
Jersey.
128
 For Haldane, such strategies were entirely consistent with the Privy Council’s 
fundamental role and function, which he regarded as revolving around the idea of 
statesmanship. This was particularly important on constitutional questions. “It is not always 
that the King can be safely advised to interfere with what belongs to the constitutions or 
systems of government of the countries of the Empire”, he explained,  
and so the Judges of the Judicial Committee have been selected because of their 
training, not only in the law, but because in the case of most of them they have 
had experience elsewhere – in the House of Commons or in the House of Lords 
as members of it, or as Chancellors or ex-Chancellors, or by training calculated to 
give what is called the statesmanlike outlook to the Judge – that is to say, the 
outlook which makes him remember that with a growing Constitution things are 
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always changing and developing, and that you cannot be sure that what was right 
ten years ago will be right to-day.
129
 
Statesmanship was not, however, confined to constitutional points. That morning, Haldane 
told his audience, the Privy Council had refused leave to appeal in three cases from Canada, 
and given permission in an appeal from the Gold Coast. The decisions had been informed by 
a sense of the relative maturity and sophistication of the systems from which the appeals had 
come. Canadians “had got their own fully organized Courts, and their own sense of 
development, and their own feeling that it is their right to dispose of their own litigation”.130 
In the Gold Coast, by contrast, “the tribunal is not developed in the same way, and the Privy 
Council sits as the guardian Justice to take care to see that justice is done”.131 It was the 
hallmark of the statesman to be guided by his sense of whether assistance would be 
unwelcome or inappropriate.
132
  
It is striking how much of Haldane’s analysis can be applied to the later decisions. Indeed, 
one commentator explained the Australian Consolidated Press decision, without reference to 
Haldane, as a reflection of the High Court of Australia’s newly enhanced reputation.133 
Haldane’s analysis also puts in a different light the criticism that, in decisions like the 
Australian Consolidated Press case and Lange v Atkinson, “the Committee’s deference to 
local assessment effectively denied the appellants in the Judicial Committee their right of 
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appeal”.134 “Denial” of a “right” sounds a note of legal formality, but the Judicial Committee 
seems not to have regarded itself as constrained by forms, or even to have been performing 
an unambiguously legal (as opposed to political) role. Apparently Lord Devlin remained of 
the view that it was not a court
135
 – perhaps influenced by the treatment of his speech in 
Rookes v Barnard in the Australian Consolidated Press case – and it is easy to see why there 
was uncertainty. The position was one of carefully cultivated ambiguity. 
 
9. Conclusion 
This essay has sought to identify, illustrate and evaluate some of the ways in which the Privy 
Council navigated the difficulty of distance. The techniques and their rationales varied 
widely, and were not mutually consistent. To that extent it is important to recognise that there 
was not one overall strategy, but, rather, a series of opportunistic attempts to maintain the 
court’s credibility and its moral authority. If there is a central, unifying theme it is the 
readiness to take advantage of ambiguities about where the court was, what its role was, and, 
even, whether it was a court at all. Equivocations about location made the difficulties of 
distance appear less sharp, and the court’s strenuous attempts to imagine itself in the 
jurisdiction from which the appeal came might even appear to dissolve those difficulties 
altogether. A related strategy involved deliberately positioning one’s analysis against the 
grain of the court’s London base; this could be done most effectively by making it clear that, 
irrespective of the underlying political structures, England had no hegemony in matters of 
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legal analysis. Questions of expertise and professionalization also prompted carefully 
equivocal answers, in which both the benefits of specialisation and anxieties about its 
potentially narrowing effects were in counterpoise. Perhaps most fundamentally, there was an 
ongoing, unresolved ambiguity about whether the Privy Council was really a court or not. In 
some rather obvious ways it was. But its formal role as advisor to the monarch, and its 
location in Downing Street, next to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
meant that it did not look like a court; and when it talked about matters of policy, or exercised 
a statesmanlike restraint in questions on which it had been asked to adjudicate, it did not 
sound like a court either. Its success in negotiating the difficulty of distance lay in the 
creation of a network of ambiguities and equivocations that it took great care not to resolve.  
